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A New Fundamental Mission for the US Space Program 
Timothy K. Roberts, Lt Col, USAF 
Introduction 
The first thirty seven years of American exploration and exploitation of space 
has been marked by two fundamental things· the forcing function of the Cold War 
and the resulting relative abundance of funding for space activities. In the public's 
mind, the Cold War ended six years ago, They and their representatives in 
Congress have been waiting for the Executive Branch to see this "fact" for some time 
and have become increasingly impatient with a lack of "appropriate" response. 
Frankly, they have been promised a peace dividend and they want it - NOW. Since 
the Executive Branch has been unable to deliver it as desired, Congress has been in 
the process of taking it. The immediate consequences of these actions are the 
precipitous drops in space funding for DoD and NASA in the Fiscal Year 1995 
budgets. A clear example has been the signal inability of the DoD and NASA to get 
Congressional support - and therefore funding - for new spacelift and satellite 
systems. The successive fates of the Advanced Launch System, the National 
Launch System, Space lifter, and various Single-Stage-to-Orbit programs are 
instructive. One reason for this failure is the lack of a generally accepted reason for 
being in space and therefore needing more cost-effective systems. 
As far as can be seen, the public no longer accepts the old, Cold War answers 
for being in space. A fundamental truth that we are being faced with is that the 
American people, in the guide of their representatives in Congress, demand a clear 
rationale for spending public monies. We're finding out that pure science and Cold 
War national security requirements as arguments for space spending are failing in 
the face of National health care or environmental clean-up, for example. To at least 
maintain our share of the Federal budget, and, incidentally, continue to perform 
those space missions we feel are essential, we are going to have to provide an 
obvious, unarguable reason to spend $14 billion a year in space. What is necessary, 
then, is a new reason for America to be in space. As the Air Force Association's 
Advisory Group on Military Roles and Missions states in their 1994 report, "There 
is little to be gained by arguing the need for increased space budgets. Rather, we 
must look toward achieving improved efficiency by eliminating areas of 
duplication and redundancy." {1:51) 
Proposed New Mission Areas 
Six new national space mission areas are proposed that truly meet public 
perceptions of public need. These new mission areas meet emerging public des ires 
for responsible stewardship of the planet and for supporting the public good. 
Frankly, they attempt to answer the layman's question, "Why are we spending 
billions in space when people are starving in the cities?" 
WEATHERMAN: Global Monitoring. This mission area consolidates NASA's 
Mission to Planet Earth and the DoD and national remote sensing missions. It 
recognizes thal the technologies, platforms, and data produced are similar (il not 
identical, in some cases). Some mission subsets are: 
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Global Environmental Monitoring. This is a public utility and includes: 
Identification of global climatological trends 
Pinpointing high-risk environmental activities 
Establishment of a global environmental database. 
Global Weather. This mission subset collects and disseminates global weather 
and other surface data to a wide variety of users. Users include military 
services, the National Oceanographic and Atmospheric Agency, and private 
and commercial users. This mission subset is also a public utility in the spirit 
of the National Weather Service. It recognizes the convergence of the Defense 
Meteorological Satellite Program and the Geostationary Orbit Environmental 
Satellite into the National Polar Orbiting Environmental Sensing Satell ite 
(NPOESS). Thanks to DoD and NOAA efforts, this mission subset is 
effectively already in operation. An interesting side note is that NPOESS 
already addresses the distinction between military and civil data collection 
and dissemination on the same satellite bus and over the same satellite control 
network. 
Military Remote Sensing. This mission subset consolidates all military and 
national remote sensing and surveillance missions. Users of this data are 
exclusively military forces and other Government agencies. Establishment of 
this mission subset allows "compartmentalization" of sensitive remote sensirfg 
capabilities and data. 
SHIELD: Ballistic Missile Defense. This mission area consolidates Army, Navy, 
Air Force, and Ballistic Missile Defense Organization programs into one operational 
mission area. It addresses the pressing need to be able to identify, track, warn, and 
possibly defend against hostile ballistic missiles launched against the US. it forces. 
and its allies. It is presented as a separate mission area in recognition of the high 
political sensitivity of ballistic missile defense. ·Exclusion of SHIELD won't cripple 
other US space efforts. Mission subsets of SHIELD are: 
• Warning of ballistic missile launch from anywhere in the world 
Identification of the source and threat level to the US, its forces, and all ies 
Continuous tracking and impact prediction 
Negation of in-flight ballistic missiles 
SENTRY: Space Survei llance and Protection. This mission area performs space 
surveillance, tracking, and negation of space threats to the US. These threats are 
both man-made and natural. However, this mission is separate from SHIELD 
because SENTRY functions can be performed with or without ballistic missile 
. defense resources. In essence, SENTRY is DoD's space control mission with 
planetary defense added. Mission subsets include: 
Space Surveillance. This mission subset uses the DoD Space Surveillance 
Network and NASA's Deep Space Network to detect, identify, and track 
objects in space. The combined network virtually exists now but needs 
improved sensors and command and con trol to make ii tru ly effective. 
Objects of interest include natural objects such as Earth-grazing asteroids. 
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comets, and meteorites and man-made objects such as active and derelict 
satellites and debris. 
Protection. This mission subset provides for protection of US space assets 
from natural and man-made threat objects through a variety of means. 
Negation. This mission subset negates space threat objects through a variety 
of means. Negation can be as mundane as military action against an enemy 
satellite in support of US combat operations. It can also be as exotic as 
deflecting an asteroid, comet, or meteorite from striking the Earth. 
CENTURION: Military Support. This mission area captures the traditional direct 
support to US combat operations. This is a critically important mission area, as 
evidenced by statements made by several senior Department of Defense officials. 
Gen Merrill A. McPeak, recent Air Force Chief of Staff, was quoted as saying 'Tm 
convinced that tomorrow we will judge a nation's power status by it's relative 
position in space." (2:2) There are many examples of CENTURION. One is the use 
of national intelligence capabilities to support combat operations. TALON SWORD 
and RADIANT OAK, two experiments in combining space capabilities to support 
air attacks on targets beyond the horizon. (3:28-29). USSPACECOM Space Support 
Teams are an integral part of providing space support to military operations and 
will be a highly visible part of CENTURION. 
FIREMAN: Civil Emergency Support. This mission area is the civil equivalent of 
military support. It focuses the entire suite of national space assets on high-priority 
civil needs, primarily in support of disaster response. This mission area is the best 
example of harnessing US space systems to the service of the well-being and 
security of American citizens. A very visible portion of FIREMAN would be Fast 
Response Space Support Teams (FRSST) providing communicat ions, weather. and 
imagery products to disaster response teams. Current DoD programs that could 
sup·port FIREMAN include the Defense Communications Satellite System. the 
National Polar Orbiting Environmental Sensing Satellite, the Global Positioning 
System, the Defense Support Program (for forest fire or pipeline fire detection), and 
national systems. FIREMAN and the associated FRSST teams would be most 
visible to the American public and could garner a lot of good will through use of 
existing DoD, national, and civil space assets to help Americans in trouble. 
COVERED WAGON: Space Exploration and Exploitation. This mission area 
continues the exploratory and scientific work the US has done for the past thirly 
seven years as well as including appropriate Government support for private sector 
exploitation of space and space resources. A key part of making COVERED 
WAGON work is developing a long-range approach to Government-funded space 
research. While the shape and direction of such a plan is beyond the scope of this 
paper, a key piece must be cost-efficiency and dual use of existing and planned 
space programs. A fundamenta l problem American space scientists now face is 
that" . . . Congress will not fund parallel programs (so] federal agencies (must look] 
seriously at consolidation and dual use .. of space assets (2:28). There are two 
·mission subsets: 
Space Exploration. This mission subset continues the grand tradition of 
American space exploration and space science. NASA's current emphasis on 
"smaller, faster, and cheaper" missions to achieve specific scientific objectives 
is appropriate for the current budget regime. However, America must never 
give up lhe vision of extending the human presence into space. A deliberately 
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planned and executed space science program is perhaps the best way to 
guarantee achieving this glorious goal. 
Space Exploitation. This mission subset contains all the support the US 
Government provides to private and commercial entities seeking to derive 
profit from space and space services. This can range from flying appropriate 
experiments aboard Government vehicles to being an "anchor tenant" to 
emerging space industries. There is a very important dynamic in this mission 
subset. On one hand, commercial space exploitation is not a Government 
function. The Government should not put itself in the position of 
guaranteeing either a market or critical pieces of services and products for 
private profit. On the other hand, the last great expansion in America 
occurred in large part because of Government support. The American West 
was opened because Federal support of railroads made service for profit 
feasible. This is a fine line and will be one of the greatest policy decisions of 
the twenty-first century. 
Implications and Consequences 
These new fundamental missions for the US space program have several 
significant implications and consequences that must be illuminated. Such a 
far-reaching restructure clearly impacts - and in some cases may well eliminate -
missions that the US space community is currently performing. 
Space Science. The COVERED WAGON mission area deliberately doesn't speak to 
large science programs. This is deliberate. Today's national mood seems to be 
rejecting large science programs regardless of what they do. Large science programs 
are seen as relics of the Cold War and the pervasive competition between the US 
and the USSR. An excellent example is the fate of the Super-Conducting Super 
Collider. Once supported as critical to unlocking key questions about the 
subatomic structure of matter, it is now considered unaffordable and has been 
summarily canceled. Space Station is facing the same pressures and may suffer the 
same fate. It must be remembered that Americans don't appear to be willing to 
fund large space science projects merely because they're performed in space. 
Commercial Space. Government support of private and commercial space 
industries is a very thorny issue. Recent h istory abounds with examples of 
industries that eventually failed due to excessive Government support, the railroads 
being one example. However, those same railroads ushered in an era of prosperity 
based on Government support in opening the American West in the form of land for 
rights-of-way and in "anchor tenancy". Space is certainly in the same position· 
much promise but a tenuous business foundation without significant support from 
the Government. As noted above, choosing the correct approach to nurturing space 
industries of many types will be one of the crucial policy decisions made in the 
early twenty-first century. The "correct approach" is defined as the one which 
empowers American industry to open space as it once opened the West and create 
an entirely new set of opportunities for a new breed of American pioneers. 
Unfortunately, the "correct approach" can only be identified in retrospect. 
Focus. This entire proposal is about focusing the American space program. The 
withering of support for space is a direct consequence of a lack of consensus about 
what space does for Americans. This proposal addresses the issue by focusing our 
space efforts on our core business in space - things that either directly benefit 
Americans now or things that enhance American prestige by providing services to 
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the world at large. Other efforts simply aren't funded by the Government. Focus is 
applied by proposing six mission areas. The consequence is that if a project doesn 't 
fit within one of the six mission areas, it won't performed by the Government. 
While this may well eliminate such programs as fl ying educational payloads, it will 
maintain a broad base of public support for space. This is crucial if America is to 
retain its position as the premier space-faring nation in the world. 
International Cooperation. The face of international cooperation will change under 
this proposal. The fate of large space science programs is problematic; therefore, 
continued existing international partnerships may be at risk. However, there will 
be opportunities for new kinds of cooperation. SHIELD could easily include 
international partners, perhaps using proposed US-Russian Early Warning Sharing 
as a prototype. WEATHERMAN can clearly accept international partners- the more 
so since what is being shared is data, not hardware. SENTRY could evolve into a 
service provided to the world at large with appropriate contributions. The new 
mission area that could reap the greatest reward in international goodwill is 
FIREMAN. Extending its benefits to international partners can garner us 
immensely valuable public relations. 
Public Access to Military Systems and Data. FIREMAN requires that the American 
public receive extensive access to systems and data that heretofore have been the 
sole province of the military and national security establishment. To cite an 
inflammatory example, high resolution imagery of disaster s ites t:an be invaluable 
in assessing the scope of the disaster and directing aid to the hardest-hit places. 
However, the current capability is highly classified and dissemination of its 
products is tightly controlled - even to the military today! (1 :52) Using all available 
US space assets for emergency support will require a drastic rethinking of this 
approach. Similar problems will arise in allocating communications between 
military and civil emergency users. Full implementation of FIREMAN will require 
that we change the way we control and operate military and national space systems. 
Supporting Missions. Little has been said in this proposal about the supporting 
missions that are needed to "make space happen." Ex<lmples are spacelift. satellite 
control. and range operations. These are missions that trnditionally fare poorly 
over time when attempting to modernize. However, expanded public support for 
the six core missions proposed will inevitably garner greatly increased support for 
these supporting missions. As with other aspects of this proposal. there are 
benefits and disadvantages. One clear disadvantage is that as the Government 
space program becomes more broadly based. individual users lose a degree of 
influence over aspects of it. For example, the Air Force has long wanted a 
responsive spacelift vehicle. Under this proposal, the Air Force will have lo "sell" 
its requirement to a wider audience than it does now. including entities that have 
little interest in military requirements. A contrasting advantage has been cited 
above several times - the broadening of the support base. As the number of users 
increases, the amount of support for budget and focused goals increases. making ii 
easier to keep the space program overall on course. Everybody wins. 
Organizational Strategies. 
"Fragmented leadership is the most prominent feature of Amerkall space 
activities." (1:50) 
"Costs are too high and space capabilities loo important to ar.commmlate 
single-service space systems." (1:53) 
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As the quotes above illustrate, the US Government is currently not 
organizationally structured to perform the kinds of integrated missions proposed. 
We have three Government space programs that compete for resources to do their 
jobs. The four space sectors· defense, intelligence, civil, and commercial - have a 
difficult time cooperating simply because the organizations set up to execute their 
responsibilities have differing purposes and are now self-perpetuating (1:51). There 
are many potential organizational strategies that might be used to meet this 
challenge, but they all need to meet certain criteria: 
There should be clear policy focus on what space can do for Americans. Space 
policy should be at a level that permits consideration of all national needs on an . 
equal footing. 
Space funding should be managed in such a way that all national needs are 
considered in developing budgets and priorities. 
Space operations should be conducted so that all national needs are serviced 
according to their priority. 
There are many studies that propose solutions to the problem. Some focus 
solely on military and national security needs (4); some take a broader view, 
anticipating this consolidated approach (5). Whether space activities are combined 
into one agency or are coordinated among many agencies in different departments, 
the criteria listed above must be met to properly bring American space assets to 
bear on national needs. 
Summary 
Focusing on America's core business in space will make current and future 
programs more relevant to Congress and the American public. Increasing relevance 
will increase support and will broaden the support base to include a much wider 
variety of users. Our ability to control and exploit space is a touchstone of our 
national power. To remain the world's premier space-faring nation, we must regain 
control of our own space program. WEATHERMAN, SHIELD, SENTRY, 
CENTURION, FIREMAN, and COVERED WAGON give us that control. 
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